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REFLECTIONS ON SECTION 402A OF THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: A
MIRROR CRACK'D*
Charles E. Cantu**
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.'
In 1965 the American Law Institute2 published Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and forever changed the means by which
an individual would be held liable for placing a defective product into the
stream of commerce.3 Strict liability, which had been previously re-
Out flew the web and floated wide;
The mirror crack'd from side to side;
'The curse is come upon me.' cried
The Lady of Shalott.
The Lady of Shalott by Alfred, Lord Tennyson.
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; B.A., University of Texas;
J.D., St. Mary's University; M.C.L., Southern Methodist University; L.L.M., University of
Michigan, Fulbright Scholar.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. The individual members at the time were: Francis M. Bird. Esq., Professor lau-
rence H. Eldredge, Professor James Fleming, Jr., Professor Robert E. Keeton. Dean W. Page
Keeton, Judge Calvert Magruder, Professor Wex Smathers Malone, Professor Allan H. Mc-
Coid, Dean William L. Prosser, Dean Samuel D. Thurman, Jr., Chief Justice Roger .J. Tray-
nor, and Dean John W. Wade.
3. Generally, before the publication and widespread adoption of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402A, unless an injured plaintiff could qualify for one of the few
narrow exceptions in strict liability, he or she had only the choice between a traditional
negligence action or a contract action based on warranty. Under traditional negligence, the
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stricted to cases involving dangerous activities" and wild animals,' became
a new cause of action in almost all product cases.' As a result, this section
of the Restatement has been a catalyst to a multitude of litigation. The
number of lawsuits arising from this one promulgation can be described
as nothing less than explosive.7 More causes of action have been brought
individual charged with placing a defective product in the stream of commerce could safely
rely on privity to escape liability. See generally McCormack v. Handscraft Co., 278 Minn.
322, -, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499-500 (1967) (court stated that this traditional limitation did
not appeal to a sense of justice). See also Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, -, 155 N.W.2d
55, 58-63 (1967) (discussing the evolution and policies involved in elimination of privity
requirement). As for a contract action on warranty, the defendant could safely hide behind
disclaimers and limitations. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, -, 161
A.2d 69, 87 (1960) (standardized limited warranties in auto industry result in "gross ine-
quality" of bargaining position for consumer).
4. Strict liability for dangerous activities is most often traced back to an 1868 English
case in which water stored in a reservoir on Mr. Ryland's property flooded Mr. Fletcher's
coal mines. See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). The English court held that
the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and
if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape.
Id. at 339-40.
Since then the policy, which has evolved to include personal injury as well as property
damage, has come to have its own set of definitions, rules, and exceptions independent of
other theories of strict liability. See Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, -_, 190 P.2d 1, 8
(1948) (use of cyanide compound by a pest exterminator); see also Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81
Wn.2d 448, 459, 502 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1973) (hauling gasoline as freight), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 983 (1973). The second Restatement sets forth the law of strict liability for dangerous
activities essentially as it was propounded in Rylands. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 519, 520 (1965).
5. It is well settled that "one who harbors a wild animal, which by its very nature is
vicious and unpredictable, does so at his peril, and liability for injuries inflicted by such
animal is absolute." Collins v. Otto, 149 Colo. 489, -, 369 P.2d 564, 566 (1962) (coyote);
Briley v. Mitchell, 238 La. 551, -, 115 So. 2d 851, 854 (1959) (wild deer; owner liable for
injuries caused regardless of how animal escaped). Even municipal corporations, which
could traditionally rely on immunity, have been held liable where a wild animal is con-
cerned. See Moloney v. City of Columbus, 2 Ohio St. 2d 213, 208 N.E.2d 141 (1965). A
guano housed at the city zoo bit and injured a young girl. Id. at -, 208 N.E.2d at 142. The
court held the city strictly liable. Id. at -, 208 N.E.2d at 146.
6. In most product liability suits, the pattern is to allege a claim of negligence, a
breach of warranty as set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code, and a claim for strict
liability in tort. See generally W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11, at 17
(1979); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY: FINAL REPORT (1977) (recounting statistics of burgeoning claims in strict product
liability).
7. See Bivins, The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposals for Legislative Re-
form, 11 AKRON L. REV. 595, 598 (1978) (describing products liability reform as a "volatile"
area of law).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
alleging strict liability for injuries caused by a defective product than in
any other area of tort law.8
Now that almost two-and-one-half decades have passed since the
adoption of this rule, much of the early uncertainty associated with it has
abated. For the most part, the concept and its elements have been clearly
established and universally accepted.' Now is a good time to look back,
consider what the drafters of this section intended, and reflect on the
judicial changes that have been brought about as a result of its
enactment.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
What should be emphasized to law students and young attorneys
alike is that this particular rule, unlike other sections of the second Re-
statement, was not a previously accepted doctrine. At the time of its
adoption, it represented neither a majority nor minority position in the
United States.10 As far back as the early 1940's, only concurring and dis-
8. While statistical findings vary from sample to sample, in general the reports sup-
port the proposition that products liability suits outnumber other types of tort actions. See
generally Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and
Compensation for Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 326-27 (1986). One sample taken in
the federal court system reported that the broad category of products liability suits esca-
lated from 1,579 in 1974 to 8,994 in 1982. Id. at 321 n.1. In cases where strict liability and
negligence were alleged, strict liability was emphasized as the primary action in the majority
of the suits. Id. at 327. Where strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty were al-
leged, strict liability was slightly more emphasized. See id. at 328. In 1976 the United States
Interagency Task Force on Products Liability estimated lawsuits of this nature at between
60,000 and 70,000 and rising at a dramatic rate. See Hearing on Products Liability Reform
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcomm. on the
Consumer, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1982) (statement of Senator Robert W. Kasten
(R.Wis.)), as reported in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH
LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS PUBLICATION: FEDERAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROPOSALS 1984, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1984); see also Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Alleged Contentious and Litig-
ious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 69 (1983) (contemporary increase in litigation caused by
changing social conditions such as greater knowledge of injury causation and better dissemi-
nation of such knowledge to consuming public).
9. See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
865-66 (1986) (Supreme Court recognizing strict products liability as part of general mari-
time law); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789-90 (Tex. 1967) (Texas
Supreme Court adopting section 402A strict liability); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735
S.W.2d 578, 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), writ ref'd, no rev. err. (noting that strict products
liability adopted and applied in Texas since 1967).
10. See, e.g., Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 919 (5th Cir. 1964). The
Fifth Circuit court, fully aware that section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in
its final form, was moving toward adoption, intimated that since 1958, practically every
court that had considered the question of applying strict liability had taken positions indi-
1989-901
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:205
senting opinions called for the application of strict liability to manufac-
turers and/or sellers of defective products." In fact, many legal writers
had been advocating such a position, 2 but until the time of its adoption,
only one court had gone so far as to impose strict products liability.' Up
to that point, the basis of liability in defective products cases had been
either negligence, or express or implied warranty.
cating a favorable response to the new section as it was ultimately written. Id. at 919 n.19.
However, in deciding Putman, the federal court noted the common obstacle: even though
the trend in Texas was toward strict liability, the Texas Supreme Court had not issued an
opinion that could absolutely guide the Fifth Circuit as to Texas law. Id. at 912. Texas, like
the majority of states, had not officially embraced the spirit, much less the text of the sec-
ond Restatement. See Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970). The Restatement reporter, Dean Prosser,
evidently made a choice to present the section, as finally expressed, so that the new Restate-
ment would not be outdated before it was released. Id. at 750.
11. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, -, 150 P.2d 436, 438-40
(1944). Technically, one of the earliest "dissents" in the area was not a dissent per se. In
1944, Judge Traynor of the California Supreme Court concurred with a decision that al-
lowed a waitress to recover for injury inflicted by an exploding soft drink bottle. The major-
ity holding was based on the defendant's negligence and the court found all the require-
ments necessary to entitle plaintiff to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Judge
Traynor, concurring in the result, dissented from the majority's reasoning and said "it
should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to human beings." Id. at -, 150 P.2d at 440.
12. Judge Traynor's 1944 concept was not totally new by any means, but until then it
had only been espoused by legal writers. See K. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF SALES 341, 342 (1930). In 1930, Professor Llewellyn argued that the law should shift
the immediate incidences of the hazards of life in an industrial society away from the indi-
vidual and over to a group which could distribute the loss. See also Llewellyn, On Warranty
of Quality and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699, 704 (1936).
13. In 1962, Judge Traynor implemented this concept first articulated in 1944. See
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 39 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962). The plaintiff had been injured by a power tool and had given written notice to the
retailer and the manufacturer of breaches of warranties, express and implied. He also sued
on grounds of negligence, citing negligent design and inspection. Id. at __, 377 P.2d at 898,
27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. In affirming the trial court's verdict for the injured plaintiff, the court
also closed doors previously used by defendants. The court first outlined the tortious maze
through which other courts had wandered to apply what was, in essence, strict liability. Id.
at -, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The court said:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of
an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff,
the abandonment of the requirement of contract between them, the recognition
that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal
to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defec-
tive products make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of con-
tract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
Id. at -, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
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The original Restatement of Torts published in the 1920's and 1930's
followed this traditional position, and included no provision for the appli-
cation of strict liability.14 By 1961, however, Tentative Draft No. 6 of the
Restatement (Second) advocated the adoption of section 402A. 15 This
new section, while recognizing that an individual could be held strictly
liable, limited the applicability of this rule to claims involving "food for
human consumption.' 16 One year later, however, it became increasingly
apparent to the Institute that the Restatement (Second) had expressed
this revolutionary new concept much too narrowly.' 7 As a result, in 1962,
Tentative Draft No. 7 extended the section to encompass " 'products in-
tended for intimate bodily use,' 'whether or not [they] ha[ve] any nutri-
tional value.' "18 This last provision was intended to clarify that such
products as "chewing gum, chewing tobacco, snuff, cigarettes, drugs,
clothing, soap, cosmetics, liniments, hair dye, and permanent wave solu-
tion" were included.'9 Apparently, the drafters of 402A felt that these
products, although intended for external use or application, were of such
"an intimate character" that they warranted liability without fault if
defective.20
The following year Justice Traynor, a member of the Institute, future
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, and major supporter of
the concept of strict liability for injuries caused by defective products,2'
wrote the opinion in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.2 2 The plaintiff in Greenman had been injured when a
shopsmith-a power tool that could be used as a saw, drill, and wood
lathe-unexpectedly ejected a piece of wood he had been working on and
caused serious injuries.2" In the product liability suit which followed, the
issues submitted to the jury included breach of implied warranties against
the manufacturer.24 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the retailer
against the plaintiff, and in favor of the plaintiff against the manufac-
14. See Putman v. Erie City Mfg., 338 F.2d 911, 918 (5th Cir. 1964) (outlining progress
and development of section 402A).
15. Id; see also Titus, supra note 10, at 713.
16. See Putman, 338 F.2d at 918.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at n.16 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1962)).
20. Id.
21. See Titus, supra note 10, at 720 (noting that Justice Traynor was adviser to Re-
statement (Second) of Torts and long-time supporter of strict products liability).
22. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
23. Id. at -, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
24. Id. at -, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
1989-90]
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turer.2 5 On appeal, the manufacturer alleged that it was not liable on the
basis of warranty because the plaintiff had failed to give notice of the
breach of warranty within a reasonable time as required by the Uniform
Commercial Code.
26
Justice Traynor, in an unprecedented move, side-stepped the issue of
breach of warranty and held the defendant liable on the basis of strict
liability.27 Justice Traynor reasoned that strict liability under the guise of
breach of warranty, whether express or implied, had in reality been in
existence for quite some time.28 Recognized first in the area of unwhole-
some food products, the doctrine was subsequently extended to include
other products where the hazard was equally as great.29 Traynor stressed
that
the abandonment of the requirement of contract between [the parties],
the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but im-
posed by law, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the
scope of its own responsibility for defective products make clear that the
liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the
law of strict liability in tort.30
II. SECTION 402A
In 1964, the Institute approved the final draft of section 402A, which
made the rule of strict liability applicable to all products. The inclusion
of this provision marked the first time in the history of the Restatement
that a new section was added which was not supported by prior case
law.3 1 Other than Yuba, no decision, much less a minority or majority
position, had authorized such a recovery as that represented by 402A.32
This fact, however, along with the argument that strict liability invaded a
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at -, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at -, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
31. Professor Titus succinctly states the argument that erupted over the adoption of
the rule and the proper role of the American Law Institute (A.L.I.). On one side stood the
critics who insisted that the Institute's role was to state the law as it would be decided by
most courts. This group took the position that "the adoption of Section 402A [was] an un-
precedented departure" from the traditional role of the Institute. Titus, supra note 10, at
747. However, Professor Titus avers that the 1923 A.L.I. organizational committee included
as one of its purposes the role of promoting changes that would better align the law "to the
needs of life." Id. at 748.
32. See Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American
Products Liability, 27 CASE W. RES. 647, 663 (1977) (stating that cases in support of section
[Vol. 25:205
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field pre-empted by legislative enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code,3 did not prevent the section's adoption. In 1965, 402A was pub-
lished as part of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 4 Although it met
with early opposition, 35 this section has become virtually the universal
rule over cases which involve injuries caused by defective products.
3 6
What has become clearer since 1965, however, is that the interpretation
of section 402A may not in all cases be the same as that originally
intended.
402A, including Yuba, were not decided until after initial tentative drafts of sections were
written); see also Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A. J. 446, 447 (1964).
33. See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication
Barriers, 17 W. RESERVE L. REV. 5, 23 (1965). Some scholars contended that the Uniform
Sales Act, predecessor of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), did not provide essential
elements for a "modern sense of justice." Article 2 of the U.C.C., on the other hand, was
regarded favorably, and section 402A was consequently regarded as "not necessary nor
wise." Id.
Professor Shanker pointed out that in the early sixties, when strict products liability
concepts were being formulated, the official text of the 1962 U.C.C. was in the process of
gradual adoption by the state legislatures. Id. at 5. He contended that the early cases in tort
were decided in favor of strict liability simply because the U.C.C. was not yet in effect in
certain states. Id. at 22. In 1965, Professor Shanker applauded the results of these decisions,
but stated that the U.C.C. should provide any further necessary relief. Id. at 47. By 1978,
however, he was apparently outraged by a perceived favoring of the Restatement position
over legislative enactments by courts. See Shanker, A Case of Judicial Chutzpah (The Ju-
dicial Adoption of Strict Tort Products Liability Theory), 11 AKRON L. REV. 697, 705
(1978). But see Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between
the U.C.C. and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692, 712 (1965) (noting that
judge-made strict products liability law "bypasses" the U.C.C., but is necessary to fill the
vacuum left by Code drafters).
Some writers have alleged that comment m of section 402A was an attempt to bypass
interference from the U.C.C. See Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's? or Should
the Judge's Monument be Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 477 (1974).
Comment m states that section 402A is not governed by the Uniform Sales Act nor the
U.C.C. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965). One writer has
stated that "[a] more beautiful example of bootstrap-pulling, not involving the pain of read-
ing the statute, would be hard to imagine. And the amazing thing is that for most judges
and pedagogues, Dean Prosser got away with it." Dickerson, supra, at 477.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
35. See generally Smyser, Products Liability and the American Lai Institute: A
Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343 (1965).
36. See Goldberg, Manufacturers Take Cover, 72 A.B.A. J. 52 (July 1986); see also W.
KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, at 14-16 & n.41 (1979). As of 1979, approxi-
mately twenty-six jurisdictions follow section 402A as written, and an additional six states
have expanded its application in various ways. Others have adopted strict liability concepts
without expressly applying 402A. Id.
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A. "One who sells . . ."
From the beginning, the section was intended to apply to situations
involving the sale of a product.17 The early cases not only supported, but
were adamant on this point."8 It did not take long, however, for the inge-
nuity of plaintiffs' attorneys and courts, eager to adopt the strict product
liability doctrine, to apply the rule to other types of transactions. Lease
agreements were the first extension. In Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing
& Rental Service, 9 the court noted that in today's modern society it is
possible to lease anything that can be purchased. 0 In discussing the situ-
ation of a leased vehicle, the court stated: "A bailor for hire, such as a
person in the U-drive-it business, puts motor vehicles in the stream of
commerce in a fashion not unlike a manufacturer or retailer.""' This sub-
jects a leased vehicle "to more sustained use on the highways than most
ordinary [purchased] car[s]," and exposes "the bailee, his employees, pas-
sengers and the travelling public . . . to a greater quantum of potential
danger of harm from defective vehicles than usually arises out of sales by
the manufacturer." '4 2 On this basis, the New Jersey court held that strict
liability should and would be applicable to the lessor of a defective prod-
uct, even though no sale had taken place. ' If the courts could hold the
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965) (justification for
the rule stems from the fact that a seller has responsibility for its product); see also Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 814-16
(1966). The author makes it clear that a sale must be involved at some point in the commer-
cial chain from manufacturer to consumer in order for strict products liability concepts to
apply. Id. at 814-15; see also R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 60 (1980) (sec-
tion 402A extends strict liability principles to all members in the chain of distribution).
38. See Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 403 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969). The court held that if a defendant was not also the seller
of the product in question, section 402A would not apply. Id. The court drew a distinction
between "sellers" and "suppliers." Sections 407 and 408 of the second Restatement deal
directly with lessors' liability, based on negligence principles rather than strict liability. Id.
at n.10. Therefore, section 402A was presumably not intended to apply to lessors. See id.;
see also Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968) (court refusing to extend strict
liability to include improper fitting of contact lenses prescribed for plaintiff because fitting
regarded as service not sale); Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104, 107
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968), writ ref'd, no rev. err. (refusing to hold hospital liable for injuries
caused by injection of contaminated medication).
39. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
40. Id. at -, 212 A.2d at 776.
41. Id. at -, 212 A.2d at 777.
42. Id.
43. Id. at -, 212 A.2d at 777-78, 781.
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seller of a defective product strictly liable,4 there seemed to be no diffi-
culty in extending this idea to a non-sale/lease transaction."'
Once freed from the parameters of the sales limitation, 402A was
soon applied to other types of bargains. For example, in subsequent cases,
strict liability has been the basis of recovery for injuries caused by a de-
fective product used in demonstrations."' The transactions were further
expanded to include free samples given to a prospective customer, 7 com-
plimentary gifts that accompanied the sale of a product," and products
loaned for the purpose of demonstration.' It has become clear from these
decisions that the original phrase "one who sells" should now be inter-
preted to mean "one who places into the stream of commerce."' 0 As long
as the product causing the injury has been placed in the market, strict
44. Id. at -, 212 A.2d at 781.
45. Id. at -, 212 A.2d at 779; see also Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251-52, 466
P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181 (1970). The court stated, "Similarly we can perceive no
substantial difference between sellers of personal property and non-sellers, such as bailors
and lessors." Id. The thrust of the court's opinion was that the policy justifications applying
to sellers of defective products apply with equal force to lessors of such products.
A restriction which has persisted is that the defendant, to be held strictly liable, must
be in the business of placing the product in question into the marketplace. See Freitas v.
Twin City Fisherman's Coop. Ass'n., 452 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), writ ref'd,
no rev. err. (defendant oil company held not liable for injuries caused by defective ladder
and platform oil tank installed by independent contractor). See generally Prosser, supra
note 37, at 814 (predicting that section 402A cannot apply to those sellers not regularly
engaged in the sale of the product at issue). But see Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp., 618
S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), writ ref'd, no rev. err. (hospital held strictly liable
for supplying defective hospital gown because not related to primary professional service
relationship between plaintiff and defendant).
46. See, e.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1964) (defendant held
strictly liable for injury caused by forklift provided as demonstrator model to plaintiff's
employer); First Nat'l Bank v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So. 2d 966, 968 (Ala. 1978) (profit
motive is apparent whenever defendant has placed product in stream of commerce, whether
or not sale has taken place).
47. See, e.g., McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1967) (de-
fendant strictly liable for injuries caused by free sample of defective permanent wave solu-
tion given by defendant to plaintiff).
48. See, e.g., Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, -, 258
N.E.2d 681, 688 (1970) (can of paint provided as free sample held to be within scope of
section 402A).
49. See, e.g., Delaney, 339 F.2d at 6 (defendant held strictly liable for injury caused by
forklift loaned to plaintiff's employer by seller of such equipment); see also McClaflin v.
Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 (1969) (bailor
of maintenance equipment held strictly liable for death of bailee resulting from defective
ladder provided).
50. Delaney, 339 F.2d at 6.
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
liability is applicable notwithstanding the fact that no sale has taken
place." The rationale for this position is that
When a product is placed in the 'stream of commerce,' the marketing
cycle as it were, whether by demonstration, lease, free sample or sale, the
doctrine should attach. In each of these situations the profit motive of
the manufacturer is apparent whether or not a 'sale' in the strict sense
takes place. Moreover, the manufacturer who enters the market is in a
better position to know and correct defects in his product and as be-
tween him and his prospective consumers should bear the risk of injury
to those prospective consumers when any such defects enter the market
uncorrected.
2
All of these reasons for applying liability without fault in a pure sales
transaction appear to be applicable to any method of distribution once
the product in question enters the market place. The seller's profit mo-
tive, coupled with the idea that the vendor should bear the risk of loss
over an innocent consumer, prevails even when the defective product en-
ters the stream of commerce in a non-sale transaction.
B. "[A]ny product . . ."
Other than New Jersey, 53 which allows a strict liability action in situ-
ations where the defendant has provided a service, all jurisdictions limit
the applicability of 402A to situations involving a product. 4 In imposing
this requirement, the courts have adhered to a strict interpretation of the
second Restatement's position. This adherence is founded on the view
that individuals like lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other persons who
51. Id.; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So. 2d 966, 968 (Ala.
1978). The Alabama court discussed "the market cycle," and held that one of the principle
underlying policies of strict liability is to place the burden of accidental injuries due to
defective products "upon those who market them." Id. at 968.
52. Id.; see also Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 139 (Ala. 1976)
("[Jlustification for new tort theory must be founded on ... notions of consumer protection
and on economic and social grounds, placing burden to compensate for loss incurred by
defective products on the one best able to prevent distribution of those products."); Hill,
How Strict is Strict?, 32 TEx. B.J. 759 (1969). The author states that if a transaction
through which a product was placed in the stream of commerce was "essentially commercial
in character," then liability would attach under section 402A, and a sale per se would be
irrelevant. Id. at 767.
53. Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (no sound reason for
restricting liability to sales of goods).
54. See Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, -, 539 P.2d 584, 587 (1975)
(Restatement (Second) deals only with the sale of products and with one exception, no
court has adopted strict liability for personal services).
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render services rather than sell products, practice inexact sciences. 55
Therefore, they should only be required to exercise their best judgment.
5 6
Since virtually no one can guarantee the result of their work, these indi-
viduals should only be held to the standard of the reasonable person.5 7 In
other words, strict liability should not be applicable to a damaging event
involving a service transaction.
The real question in many cases is whether the situation involves the
sale of a product, so that 402A is applicable, or involves the rendering of a
service. Transactions which involve elements of both product sales and
services have generated their share of litigation." In response to this di-
lemma, the courts have devised the "predominant factor" test, which
seeks to determine the main thrust of the transaction.59 Did the individ-
ual sell a product with incidental services attached thereto, for example,
installation of a water heater? 60 Or, was the main purpose of the transac-
tion rendering a service with a product incidentally involved, such as fit-
ting an individual with contact lenses?6" If the basis of the transaction is
found to be the sale of a product, the courts have unhesitatingly applied
strict liability. If on the other hand, the predominant factor is found to be
a service, section 402A is not applicable.6 1 In most cases, this "predomi-
nant factor" test presents a question of fact for the jury. When, however,
the issue is so clear that reasonable minds could not differ, the final de-
termination of the issue would be for the court.
One notable exception to this sort of transaction concerns the use of
blood. Some jurisdictions maintain that blood transfusions involve the
55. See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, -, 256 N.W.2d 379, 392-93 (1977)
(moving from malpractice to strict liability appears dubious); see also Gagne v. Bertran, 43
Cal. 2d 481, -, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954) (hiring experts does not justify expectations of
infallibility).
56. See, e.g., Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, -, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954) (attorneys
exercise best judgment in duty entrusted to them).
57. Gagne, 43 Cal. 2d at __, 275 P.2d at 21.
58. See, Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel Under Assault, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 13, 18 (1978) (the area between pure sales and pure services has caused
confusion).
59. See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 104, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794
(1954) (when transfer of property is only incidental to a service, it is not a sales transaction).
60. See Kopet v. Klein, 275 Minn. 525, -, 148 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1967) (the transac-
tion involved in the sale of a chattel and a related service, such as installation, causes the
buyer to expect an installed product).
61. See Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968) (strict liability not applied to
prescription, fitting, and sale of contact lenses).
62. See Delta Ref. Co. v. Procon, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976) (no
strict liability for properly installing pump with a latent defect).
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sale of a product, and as such strict liability is applicable.63 Other juris-
dictions view the transaction as the rendering of a service, making 402A
inapplicable."' These two positions appear to be incapable of reconcilia-
tion and the reader should be aware of this dichotomy.
Another problem with the sale of goods, which has given rise to much
litigation, revolves around used, rather than new, products. Does strict
liability apply when a used product has been introduced into the stream
of commerce? The second Restatement is silent on this point, 5 and the
jurisdictions that have addressed the question are divided.6 6 Those that
take the position that strict liability is not available for the sale of a used
product 7 reason that such a product is no longer within the original pro-
duction and marketing chain. Therefore, the reasons for imposing liabil-
ity without fault-the seller's ability to treat such liability as a produc-
tion cost, 9 and the ability of a seller to exert pressure on the
manufacturer to enhance the safety of the product 7°- are not present.
Imposing liability would, in effect, make the original seller an insurer,
holding that seller strictly liable for defects which could have arisen while
the product was under the control of an intermediate consumer.
Supporters of the view that sellers of used products should be strictly
liable point out that the second Restatement makes no distinction be-
tween products that are new and those that are used, but instead merely
speaks in terms of any defective product. 1 Furthermore, sellers of a de-
fective used product have profited by introducing this article into the
63. See Weber v. Charity Hosp., 487 So. 2d 148, 150 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (blood bank,
as distributor, strictly liable).
64. See Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hosp., 204 Conn. 399, -, 528 A.2d 805, 808
(1987) (transaction labeled service is outside of product liability).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
66. See generally Comment, Used Products and Strict Liability: Where Public Safety
and Caveat Emptor Intersect, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 330 (1983).
67. See Peterson v. Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975)
(used car dealer could not be held strictly liable as a matter of law when there was no
allegation as to whether the defect existed when product left manufacturer's control or was
created by the dealer).
68. Id. at -, 329 N.E.2d at 787 (imposing strict liability on such facts would make
the car dealer an insurer against defects which may not have existed until after the chain of
distribution was completed).
69. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, -, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (risk spread among public as a cost of doing business).
70. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, -, 247 N.E.2d 401, 404
(1969) (strict liability arises from sellers' role in the marketing scheme and affords more
incentive for safety).
71. See Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (nothing in




stream of commerce. Therefore, the sellers, and not the innocent purchas-
ers, should, like the manufacturers, wholesalers, or any other retailers,
bear the loss of a damaging event. These jurisdictions have had no diffi-
culty in extending the impact of 402A to an area that was either not in-
tended to be included by the writers of this section or at least was not
foreseen as an area of concern. Nevertheless, liability for used products
has been clearly established in some jurisdictions.
An additional area in which 402A has had an important impact in-
volves real estate transactions. Even though the largest number of re-
ported decisions deal with the doctrine of strict liability as it relates to
the sale of personal property, some courts have had little difficulty in ex-
tending the idea from chattels to the sale of land72 and houses. 3 In fact,
the concept that a house constitutes a product is widely accepted.14 This
is especially true in situations where new homes are constructed by mass
production developers.75 The reasoning is that by employing mass pro-
duction techniques, the developer resembles the manufacturer of chattels
and should be held liable accordingly.7"
Perhaps the greatest area of concern in future years is how far the
courts will be willing to extend this concept of a "product." As shown, the
courts have had little difficulty in expanding the impact of 402A to situa-
tions not mentioned by the original text of the section, as well as to trans-
actions involving non-chattels, such as those involving land and houses.
Recent cases have gone so far as to hold that commodities, such as water
and electricity, constitute products for purposes of 402A.77 How much
further can this concept be stretched? Could contaminated air fromn an
air conditioning unit, or the paved surface of a road or highway be consid-
72. See Avner v. Longridge Estate, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969)
(strict liability applied to house lots which subsided due to defective subsurface conditions).
73. See Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 2d 769, 773, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1973)
(strict liability applied where design defect of residential building and installation of an
object on the building causes injury).
74. See Vincent v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 1978 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 8,278
(when parties contract to build and purchase a home, the completed structure constitutes a
product within section 402A).
75. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, __, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965) (no
meaningful differences between the mass-production of homes and the mass production of
automobiles).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 348 Pa. Super. 177, -, 501
A.2d 1128, 1133 (1985) (electricity is a product for the purposes of strict liability under
section 402A); Aversa v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 186 N.J. Super. 130, -, 451 A.2d
976, 980 (1982) (where electricity is placed in the stream of commerce, principles of strict
liability are applicable); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, -, 275
N.W.2d 641, 648 (1979) (electricity is a product for the purposes of strict liability).
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ered a product? The answer is limited only by the ingenuity, imagination,
and foresight of future plaintiff's attorneys and courts sympathetic to the
expectations of consumers.
C. "[I]n a defective condition . .
Perhaps the part of 402A that has caused the most debate, spawned
the most litigation, and evoked the most creativity from the courts con-
cerns the concept of "defect."" s From the beginning, the drafters were
adamant that the purpose of this provision was not to impose absolute
liability where liability would attach merely because an injury had oc-
curred.7 9 Instead, they advanced the position of strict liability, where lia-
bility would arise because one had placed a dangerously defective product
that caused injury into the stream of commerce." As a result, establishing
the defect became the crux of all products liability cases.8 ' Initially, there
was some confusion as the courts struggled to define this element.8 2 Some
of the confusion stemmed from the fact that the courts failed to recognize
the different stages during which a product may develop a defect, and
instead applied a uniform test in all situations. The courts did not recog-
nize that the test used to determine whether a product was mismanufac-
tured was not necessarily the appropriate test to determine whether the
product was defective due to error in the designing or marketing pro-
cess.13 In addition, if one considers that no product is ever technologically
perfect, that at some level of investigation all goods are flawed, 4 then it
becomes necessary to utilize some judgmental standard to determine
78. See generally Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV.
339 (1974).
79. See Rooney v. Federal Press Co., 751 F.2d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 1984) (section 402A
was never intended to turn the manufacturer into an insurer for all its products).
80. The argument is founded on the literal reading of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which states that "[olne who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the . ..user or consumer, or to his property .... "
81. Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, -,
230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (1975) (an unreasonably dangerous defective condition is a requisite
element to strict liability).
82. Compare Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, -, 435 P.2d 806, 808 (1967)
(product is defective if it does not meet the reasonable expectations of the average user)
with Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, -, 525 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1974) (utility of
product may be so high that change to alleviate danger may impair utility, or cost of change
may be so great that no one would buy the product).
83. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30
(1973).
84. See Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of
Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425, 430 (1974) (all products flawed at some techno-
logical level); id. at n.11 (to metallurgist, all structures have flaws).
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when these conditions emerge as a "defect." This dilemma was eventually
solved when it became apparent that when speaking in terms of defect,
the courts were confronted with three different facets of the same prob-
lem. It soon became apparent that a product could be defective either
because it was mismanufactured,
s5 misdesigned, s and/or mismarketed,
87
and that the most appropriate test for each is not necessarily the same.
1. Mismanufactured Products
The most appropriate means for determining whether a product is
defective because it has been mismanufactured is whether the product, as
placed into the stream of commerce, 8 meets the reasonable expectations
of the ordinary user-consumer.8 9 The objective approach is best suited for
this scenario, because the product causing the injury is different from the
rest of those produced by the defendant. In its defective condition, it
stands alone. To illustrate, consider that when a product is mismanufac-
tured it may be defective for one of two reasons: The manufacturer may
have used substandard or non-complying raw materials,9" or the product
may have been misassembled.9 1 In either case, the item as introduced into
the market place is in a condition not intended by the manufacturer. The
best test, therefore, in determining whether such a product is in fact de-
fective is the reasonable expectations test:92 Considering the particular
85. See Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1972) (in applying
Alabama law, the court of appeals stated that it is settled law that manufacturers' liability is
predicated upon negligence in design or manufacture; the jury was permitted to infer negli-
gence from evidence of an actual defect in the product).
86. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, -, 154 N.W.2d 488, 498 (1967)
(plaintiff was able to show that steam vaporizer which scalded a child was defectively
designed because manufacturer did not guard against the foreseeable danger that a child
could overturn it, even though a safe and practical alternative design was available).
87. See McCormick v. Bacyrus-Erie Co., 81 Ill. App. 3d 154, -, 400 N.E.2d 1009,
1014 (1980) (manufacturer has duty to give adequate instructions for product use as well as
warnings against dangers in the use of its product).
88. See Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, -, 435 P.2d 806, 308 (1967) (manu-
facturer liable for an unreasonably dangerous product that is placed on the market).
89. Id. at __, 435 P.2d at 808 (unreasonably dangerous to user means dangerous to an
extent beyond that contemplated by ordinary user).
90. See Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1972) (there was evi-
dence the defendant's supplier used "dirty" steel to manufacture defective fan blades and
the plaintiff produced expert testimony to show that the steel used was the proximate cause
of the damaging event).
91. Curtiss v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 82 Wn.2d 455, 471, 511 P.2d 991, 1000
(1973) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (no question that plaintiff's
injuries were caused by improper assembly).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965) (among other ele-
ments, defective condition is defined as that condition not contemplated by the user which
is unreasonably dangerous to the user).
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characteristics and general usage of the product, as well as representa-
tions concerning the product by advertisements or otherwise, were certain
expectations created regarding its use?93 If these expectations are not met
and if, as a result, the item is unreasonably dangerous, then the product
is deemed to be defective. 4 This standard is by no means universally ap-
plied, and as to some products, such as food, the courts at first applied
other standards.9 In the final analysis, however, the reasonable expecta-
tion test has been accepted by a majority of jurisdictions and appears to
be the best means of accomplishing the court's objective of determining
whether the product in question is a defective one.
2. Misdesigned Products
The best way of determining whether a product is defective because
it has been misdesigned is the risk-benefit analysis.96 Misdesigned prod-
ucts hold the possibility of condemning the defendant's entire production
93. See Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Func-
tion and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1370 (1974). In
his "Statement of the Thesis," Professor Shapo states that product disappointment depends
on a portrayal made or permitted to be made by the seller. The portrayal is viewed in
context of the impression that it is reasonable for the consumer to receive from the adver-
tised product's appearance as well as the widespread social consensus of the product's func-
tion. Id.
94. See Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Impos-
ing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REV. 465, 466 (1978) (does the
product deviate from what it should be, and if so, is the deviation the reason for injury). But
see Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 1185, 1211 (1976) .(consumer should be given credit for expecting product to be
reasonably safe).
95. Some jurisdictions have followed what is known as the "foreign-natural" doctrine
which emerged in Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936). In Mix, the
California Supreme Court held that a chicken bone in a chicken pie could not be called a
foreign substance and should have been anticipated. Thus, the dish was not unfit for human
consumption. The foreign-natural view is clear cut as long as the object encountered is obvi-
ously foreign. See, e.g., Athens Canning Co. v. Ballard, 365 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963) (burr in a can of peas); Brumit v. Cokins, 281 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), writ
ref'd, no. rev. err. (glass in milkshake). However, many jurisdictions have rejected the for-
eign-natural test in favor of the reasonable expectation test. See Zabner v. Howard John-
son's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (consumer injured by walnut shell in
bowl of maple-walnut ice cream). "The test should be what is 'reasonably expected' by the
consumer in the food as served, not what might be natural to the ingredients of the food
prior to preparation." Id. at 826.
96. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, -, 525 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1974)
(utility of product may be so great that design change to alleviate danger may impair
utility).
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line."7 This approach takes into consideration that, unlike the producer of
a mismanufactured product, the defendant in these instances intended to
place the product into the stream of commerce in its present condition.
9 8
In determining whether such a product is defective, the courts engage in a
balancing test, weighing the risk involved in introducing the product into
the market place in its present condition against the burden of reducing
or eliminating the risk of harm from the product.9" The outcome is then
weighed against the benefit that would arise from a safer design.'00 If,
after the damaging event has occurred, it is determined that the benefit
to society of a safer design would have been greater than the burden in-
volved in reducing or eliminating the risk, the product is deemed to be
defective.101 If, on the other hand, the burden would have been greater
than the benefit to be derived from eliminating or reducing the risk, the
product is not defective. 0 2
When analyzing the burden of reducing or eliminating the risk, we
are speaking in terms of an alternate design,' 3 which takes into account
such factors as cost,' 4 utility,'05 marketability,' 6 state of the art,' 7 and,
97. Id. at -, 525 P.2d at 1037 (a case in which the product claimed to be defective
and dangerous due to misdesign is not as simple as a case of mismanufacture because all
products in that line are the same).
98. Id. (the law assumes the manufacturer has knowledge of the product's dangerous
tendency).
99. See Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470, 467 P.2d 229, 232, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 632 (1970) (reasonable care involves balancing the likelihood and gravity of harm
against the burden to avoid the harm).
100. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. 825,
844 (1973) (is the social usefulness of product so high that defendant should not be liable
for the injuries).
101. See, e.g., Helicoid Gage Div. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974), writ ref'd, no. rev. err. (evidence showed that shatterproof material would have only
increased unit cost by approximately one dollar).
102. See, e.g., Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, -, 484 P.2d 47, 62 (1971)
(defendant was not required to spend such sums of money to design a braking system that
would price the product out of the market).
103. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, -, 154 N.W.2d 488, 494 (1967)
(product's defect could have been eliminated by adopting an existing alternative design).
104. See Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), writ
ref'd, no. rev. err. (court held that stove was defectively designed because a valve which
could not have been accidentally turned on would have only cost manufacturer an addi-
tional $1.50).
105. See Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff argued
that the blade guard of a table saw should have been designed to be non-removeable; how-
ever, the court held that because the guard was an obstruction to other standard uses, the
saw's utility would be substantially impaired if the guard could not be removed).
106. See Garst, 207 Kan. at -, 484 P.2d at 62.
107. The phrase "state of the art" is subject to different interpretations. The emphasis
of the phrase "defective condition" means that the condition was not contemplated by the
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of course, safety."'0 When dealing with the issue of benefit, however, we
are concerned with a product where the risk of harm or the potential for
harm has been greatly reduced."0 9 This test of analyzing the risk and ben-
efit of a particular product is best suited for such common situations as
those where a defect is allegedly due to the absence of a safety device,
such as a guard on a machine,"0 or an electrical interlock cut-off de-
vice,"' or a safety on a gun." 2 In addition, multitudes of cases involve
allegations of defects concerning fabrics that are inherently dangerous be-
cause they have not been treated with an effective flame retardant chemi-
cal, ' 3 or drain cleaners with chemical compositions that are too caustic.
'14
In all of these instances, the burden of redesigning the product must be
weighed against the resulting benefit, and as previously mentioned, if the
benefit outweighs the burden, the product is deemed defective.
1 5
consumer at the time the product left the seller's hands. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A comment g (1965). Thus a manufacturer should not be liable for a product
that met the level of scientific or technical knowledge at the time of the sale, even though
that knowledge may have been superseded at a later date. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta
Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976). The question then becomes: what is the state of the art
at the time of the sale? See Boatland v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex. 1980).
108. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, -, 154 N.W.2d 488, 496
(1967) (manufacturer subject to liability for failure to use reasonable care to protect against
unreasonable risk when product used for intended purpose).
109. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), af/'d, 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973) ($200 to $500 cutter guards on $8,000 slitter machine would not dimin-
ish usefulness and would decrease seriousness of potential harm).
110. See Annotation, Products Liability: Duty of Manufacturer to Equip Product
With Safety Device to Protect Against Patent or Obvious Danger, 95 A.L.R. 3d 1066
(1979).
111. Fischer v. Cleveland Punch & Shear Works Co., 91 Wis. 2d 85, -, 280 N.W.2d
280, 285 (1979) (manufacturer liable, inter alia, in failing to provide interlock switch that
would make inadvertent tripping of control impossible).
112. Phillipe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151, 155 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (evidence
of defect in safety mechanism or pin on shotgun that exploded sufficient to hold manufac-
turer and importer liable).
113. See, e.g., Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1026 (1st Cir. 1973)
(flannelette material unreasonably dangerous without effective retardant in fabric); Ross v.
John's Bargain Stores Corp., 464 F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir. 1972) (seller could be held liable for
death resulting from nightgown igniting while one foot away from heater); La Gorga v. Kro-
ger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 381 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (seller of child's jacket which caught fire held
strictly liable), alf'd, 407 F.2d 671 (d Cir. 1969).
114. See, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1089-90 (N.D. Ohio
1975), modified and aff'd, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978) (manufacturer of liquid drain cleaner
liable for chemical burns suffered by infant).
115. See, e.g., Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, -. , 166 S.E.2d 173, 192 (1969) (man-
ufacturer at little or no cost could change composition of knob on gear shift lever so as not
to deteriorate and avoid exposing driver to impalement in a collision). But see Dreisonstok
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974) (if design change adds to price
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Two related issues regarding a misdesigned product include the
problems of misuse and obvious dangers. When a product has been mis-
used, may the defendant be absolved of liability? The answer depends
upon whether such misuse was foreseeable." 6 If the manufacturers placed
the product into the stream of commerce, and could or should have fore-
seen the misuse in question, then they remain liable for resulting injuries
under the risk-benefit analysis." 7 Individuals are required to take fore-
seeable misuses into consideration when engaged in the product design.
Obvious dangers in the product, on the other hand, present a more com-
plex analysis. In these instances, the injured party's contributory negli-
gence must be factored into the damaging event."' If, for example, rea-
sonably prudent persons would not have exposed themselves to the
danger in question, then defendants may escape liability on the basis of
the injured party's contributory negligence." 9 If, however, reasonable per-
sons would have used the product in its present condition, the defendants
may remain liable for resulting injuries. 2 ° The theory behind this rule is
that the courts do not wish to reward individuals by absolving them of
liability when they have placed a product with an obvious design defect
into the stream of commerce. 2 '
Finally, it should be noted that like the test for mismanufactured
products, the risk-benefit analysis is not universally applied. However,
this test appears to be the best means for accomplishing the courts' objec-
tive, which is to determine whether the product in question is defective.
so as to take product out of price range and intended market, it may be unreasonable to
require adoption of change).
116. See Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, -, 509 P.2d 28, 31 (1973) (use
must be so unusual that average user could not reasonably expect item to withstand
misuse).
117. Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Products, Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46, -, 258 N.E.2d 652,
665 (1970) (Sharp, J., concurring) (misuse defense available when product used in manner
not reasonably foreseeable nor for a reasonably foreseeable purpose).
118. See Compo v. Schofield, 301 N.Y. 468, -, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950) (manufac-
turer under no duty to guard against injury from obviously dangerous source).
119. Id. (manufacturer had right to expect persons would avoid contact when nature
of article gives warning of danger).
120 See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461, 468 (1973) (many articles defy detection of defect except by expert).
121. See Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 509, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 719
(1970) (manufacturer should not escape liability when product design was obviously bad).
The court further supported its reasoning, stating, "[L]aw [should] discourage misdesign
rather than encouraging it in obvious form." Id.
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3. Mismarketed Products
The test for determining whether a product has been mismarketed is
the risk-benefit analysis. 2 ' Once again, if an individual has intended to
introduce the product into the stream of commerce in its present condi-
tion,12 the same concern with risk, burden,'124 and resulting benefit'2 5
must be applied to the fact situation at hand. The main difference be-
tween a product that has been misdesigned and one that has been mis-
marketed, however, is that instead of concentrating on an alternate de-
sign, the courts in these latter instances must focus on the instructions
and warnings that accompany or should accompany the product. These
two points differ in that instructions pertain to the effective use of a
product, 26 whereas warnings deal with its safe use.
12
1
Since it is impossible to warn and/or instruct users and consumers of
all possible risks inherent in the use of a particular item, the first ques-
tion encountered is how much of an instruction or warning must be
given? 12' The importance of this question is accentuated by two facts.
First, it would appear that since the burden would always be to issue
additional information and the benefit would always be a safer product,
then the decisions involving a mismarketed product would consistently
result in a finding of defect. However, the second fact, the law of dimin-
122. See Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REV. 398,
403 (1970) ("[Tlhe question whether a product was properly designed is inseparable from
the question whether adequate instructions are provided to insure safe usage."); see also
Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liabil-
ity for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 844 (1976) ("[T]he reasonable -with-full-
knowledge-test gives an important additional perspective to the meaning of 'unreasonably
dangerous.' ").
123. See supra text accompanying note 98.
124. See Pavildes v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984)
(burden of warning costs manufacturer little to prevent losses and avert harm).
125. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973)
(user has right to make decision whether to be exposed to risk product entails).
126. See, e.g., McCully v. Fuller Brush Co., 68 Wn.2d 675, 678, 415 P.2d 7, 10 (1966)
("Directions and warnings are intended to serve different purposes. The former are designed
to assure effective use of the product; a warning on the other hand, is intended to assure a
safe use.").
127. See, e.g., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, -, 667 P.2d 750, 758
(1983) ("Instructions are to be followed to secure the most efficient or satisfactory use of the
product; warnings are instructions as to dangers that might occur if the instructions are not
followed.").
128. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 514
(1976). To be effective, a warning must be selective. To have impact, manufacturers must
select carefully the dangers which are to become part of the consumer's reasoning process
when using the product. Id.
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ishing returns, soon becomes evident in these cases. If the instructions
and/or warnings become too voluminous, the individuals involved will
more than likely disregard this information.'29 Therefore, the burden be-
comes one of issuing the right amount of information. This dilemma often
becomes clearer in hindsight than at the time the product was initially
introduced into the stream of commerce.' As a result, the test for deter-
mining whether the aim of issuing adequate warnings and instructions
has been met is determined by the reasonable prudent person. Would a
reasonable person be satisfied by the amount of information given? 3' If
the answer is yes, then the product is not deemed to be defective. 2 If on
the other hand, a reasonable individual would have desired more data,
the product is said to be defective in this regard, and the end result is the
conclusion that the product has been inismarketed."'3
The next question that arises in this area is: To whom should this
information be given?'13  This issue becomes increasingly complex when
dealing with a product that is capable of inflicting harm as it passes
129. See id. ("The story of the boy who cried wolf is an analogy worth contemplating
when considering the imposition of a warning in a case of rather marginal risk.").
130. Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 865 (1975). In Griggs, components of a wheel rim assembly were mismatched by a
prior owner. This damaging event occurred more than 25 years after manufacture of the
part. The manufacturer had distributed literature to wholesalers and retailers warning of
the danger of mismatching components. The court held that it was unreasonable for a sup-
plier to entrust distribution of the safety information to middlepersons in the distribution,
when it was possible to affix warnings to the components themselves.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965), describes a product
as defective when it is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer." It is
making the user/consumer aware of such a condition that is the purpose of an adequate
warning. In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), it was held that there was a duty to warn if a reasonable person
would want to know of the risk and then decide whether to take that risk. In Reyes v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), the
defendant, a manufacturer of polio vaccine, had distributed information to public health
departments about the remote possibility of a recipient contracting polio from the vaccine.
The court held the defendant liable to the plaintiff who contracted polio after the vaccine
was administered by a public health agency. Although a warning circular was contained in
the vaccine's packages, it was not seen by or read to the plaintiff's parents. Id. at 1270. The
court reasoned that because it was foreseeable that the vaccine would not be administered
by a prescribing physician, the risk, regardless of how remote, was one the consumer would
want to know, and thus the package circular was an inadequate warning. Id. at 1277-78.
132. See supra note 131.
133. Id.
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965); see also 72 C.J.S. Products
Liability § 27 (Supp. 1975).
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through the various stages of its marketing scheme."35 In other words, it
may be necessary to issue warnings and instructions to individuals other
than the ultimate users and/or consumers originally mentioned in
402A.136 For example, if the product is one capable of inflicting harm
while on display in a shop, prospective customers and shoppers should be
alerted accordingly.1 3 7 Unfortunately, this is a problem that often be-
comes more clear after a damaging event has taken place. Therefore, the
solution to avoiding liability is to warn or instruct all foreseeable plain-
tiffs. 38 The issue of foreseeability, more often than not, will be a question
of fact for the jury.1 39 This seems to be the most effective means of dis-
cerning exactly to whom these warnings and instructions should be given.
The issues of obvious dangers and misuse, discussed with regard to
design defects, resurface in the arena of marketing defects. In this regard,
it should be noted that unlike misdesigned goods, there is no duty to
warn against obvious dangers.14 ' As one court has said, "We hardly be-
lieve it is anymore necessary to tell an experienced factory worker that he
should not put his hand into a machine that is at that moment breaking
glass than it would be necessary to tell a zookeeper to keep his head out
of a hippopotamus' mouth."'' The real question in cases of this nature is
whether the danger in question was obvious. 4" In many instances, reason-
able minds will differ on this point, so the question is often one for the
135. See Giordano v. Ford Motor Co., 165 Ga. App. 644, 299 S.E.2d 897 (1983) (manu-
facturer of component part of larger product may have duty to warn ultimate user of
hazards connected with part).
136. See McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, -, 181 N.E.2d
430, 433, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 407, - (1962) (duty to warn extends to ultimate purchasers, their
employees, and to third persons exposed to foreseeable risk).
137. See, e.g., Davis v. Gibson Prod. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), writ
ref'd, no rev. err. (failure to place sharp machetes out of reach of customers and failure to
warn customers as to danger constituted sufficient evidence to require submission of issue
relating to strict liability to jury).
138. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, -, 214 A.2d 694, 699 (1965) (policy
which protects user/consumer should also protect bystander); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 130.
139. See Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969) (when lawn
mower threw bolt that struck bystander, whether manufacturer should have warned by-
stander was a question for the jury).
140. Bishop v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 814 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1987) (manufacturer
has no duty to warn if danger is obvious).
141. Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, -, 247 A.2d 603, 606 (1968).
142. Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp., 468 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (whether
danger is open and obvious is an objective test based on what the user should have known).
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jury.' 3 However, if it is clear that the condition in question is obvious,
there is no corresponding duty to warn of its danger.44
Situations involving the misuse of a product, on the other hand, gen-
erally depend upon the single element of foreseeability.'" If the product's
misuse is foreseeable, also a question of fact for the jury,'W then there is a
duty to warn and/or to issue adequate instructions. 41 If, however, the use
of the product in question was an unforeseeable one, there is no corre-
sponding duty to warn and/or to issue instructions for the product's
u s e .
4 s
A special problem is encountered in the marketing of a product when
dealing with drugs and products that cause allergic reactions. Drugs are
divided into two categories: Those sold over-the-counter or those sold by
prescription."' If the particular drug falls into the former category, then
all instructions and warnings should be given to the potential user/con-
sumer.' ° If, on the other hand, the product is sold by prescription, then
the required information should be given to the "learned intermediary"
143. -Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Washington,
J., dissenting) (question of fact as to whether manufacturer could justifiably expect user to
be aware of danger), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).
144. See Jamieson, 247 F.2d at 28.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 comment k (1965): "Foreseeable uses and
risks. The manufacturer may, however, reasonably anticipate other uses than the one for
which the chattel is primarily intended. The maker of a chair, for example, may reasonably
expect that someone will stand on it .... "
146. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, -, 332 A.2d 11, 16 (1975) ("There is a vast
middle ground of product uses about which reasonable minds could disagree as to whether
they are or should be foreseeable to the manufacturer, thus requiring resolution by the trier
of fact ... ."); see also Giordano v. Ford Motor Co., 165 Ga. App. 644, -, 299 S.E.2d 897,
899 (1983) (duty to warn depends on foreseeability of use in question, danger involved, and
foreseeability of consumer knowledge of danger, which are matters not compatible with
summary judgment).
147. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 288, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968)
(foreseeable to a tire manufacturer that tires would be subject to overloading and therefore
had a duty to inform and instruct users as to safe carrying capacity and to warn of the
danger of overloading).
148. Trotter v. Hamill Mfg. Co., 143 Mich. App. 593, -, 372 N.W.2d 622, 626 (1985)
(where seat belt assembly was removed from a conventional automobile and installed by
decedent in a dune buggy, the court held that neither the seat belt manufacturer nor the
manufacturer of the vehicle had a duty to warn of the danger of such an unforeseeable use).
149. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (manufacturers have duty to warn ultimate purchasers of in-
herent dangers in over-the-counter drugs, but producer of prescription drugs need only warn
prescribing physician, a "learned intermediary" between manufacturer and consumer).
150. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 294-95 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(plaintiff on recommendation of physician purchased non-prescription spermicide, yet man-
ufacturer still had duty to warn purchaser of product's side effects), afJ'd in part, modified
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or prescribing physician.' 5 ' The most notable exception to this rule in-
volves prescription drugs dispensed by some other means. If, for example,
the drug is used in a mass inoculation, such as the polio vaccine, then as
with over-the-counter drugs, the rule is that the information should be
given directly to the patient.'5 2 The rationale for this rule is that the dis-
pensing physician may not be present to warn or inform the person di-
rectly of any impending danger. 53
In the case of allergic reactions to products, the jurisdictions have
developed three prevailing rules. One is that there is no duty to warn of
an idiosyncratic reaction to a product unless there is an "appreciable
number" of individuals who are allergic to it."4 The second is that there
is a jury question as to whether a warning must be given if "some" indi-
viduals will be hypersensitive to the product,'5 5 and finally, the most
stringent position is that there must be an accompanying warning in
those instances where "a" person may suffer some harm from the use of
the product.' The weight of recent authority, however, favors the first
position.
57
in part, and remanded, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
151. McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d, 21, 24 (Okla. 1982) (regarding prescription products or
devices, the general rule is that the manufacturer has a duty to warn only the prescribing
physician).
152. Where a prescription med'cine is dispensed at a mass inoculation or public clinic
when there is no prescribing physician, as an exception to the general rule, the manufacturer
has a duty to warn the patient foi (,on-over-the-counter drug medicines. Such use is foresee-
able and in such cases the manufacturer is responsible for warning the consumer to balance
the risks against the drug's benefit. Re, !s, 498 F.2d at 1264.
153. Id. at 1276.
154. See, e.g., Tayar v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 460 F.2d 494, 496 (10th Cir. 1972)
(idiosyncratic reaction to hair rinse, normally safe to the public, did not entitle plaintiff to
recover); Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790, 793 (Ala. 1984) (manufacturer of over-the-
counter drug not liable under theories of negligence, strict liability, or breach of implied
warranty for failure to warn of injuries resulting from allergic reaction by hypersensitive
user); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Morgan, 444 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), writ ref'd,
no rev. err. (plaintiff who was hypersensitive failed to show she was within the class of users
that defendant could reasonably foresee); Presbrey v. Gillett Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1082, -,
435 N.E.2d 513, 520 (1982) (rule barring idiosyncratic users from recovery'applies where suit
is brought under negligence, warranty, or strict liability).
155. Holmes v. Grumman Allied Indus., 103 A.D.2d 909, __, 478 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145
(1984) (notwithstanding small percentage of persons sensitive to subject chemical, possibil-
ity of danger raised substantial fact issue).
156. McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, -, 528 P.2d 522, 530
(1974) (not unreasonable to impose liability where product only dangerous to small percent-
age of consumers).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965) (warning required
where product contains ingredient to which substantial number of population will be aller-
gic); see also 72 C.J.S. Products Liability § 26b (Supp. 1975).
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From the above discussion relating to "a defective product," one may
conclude that what was published in 1965 has evolved into a broader con-
cept than intended by the framers of the second Restatement.'5 The
courts have taken section 402A and extended it into areas most likely not
contemplated by the original drafters.'59 While this phenomenon is prob-
ably best illustrated by the sections dealing with products and defects, it
is by no means limited to these areas.
D. "[U]nreasonably dangerous . . ."
The phrase "unreasonably dangerous" was inserted in 402A to distin-
guish between those products capable of causing injury and those prod-
ucts causing injury because they are in a defective condition, and there-
fore, unreasonably dangerous.1 6 0 In other words, there was a general
agreement that such products as butter, drugs, whiskey, cigarettes, and
automobiles can cause harm even though there is nothing wrong with
them. ' The intent of 402A, however, was to impose liability only when
158. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964). In Putman, Judge
Wisdom summarized the development of section 402A, pointing out that the original Re-
statement of Torts had no provision for strict liability. Id. at 918-19.
In 1961, Tentative Draft No. 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recommended the
adoption of section 402A, but limited application to "food for human consumption." Appli-
cation was expanded to include items of "intimate bodily use" and "products intended for
external application or contact." However, in May, 1964, the final draft of section 402A was
approved expanding the application to all products. See supra Section I. Historical
Background.
159. See supra Section I. Historical Background.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965): "(1) One who sells any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property." (emphasis added)
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965):
Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consump-
tion, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from
over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil
found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture. That is not what is meant
by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it
will make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad
whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fuel oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smok-
ing may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be un-
reasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because,
if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart at-
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the product was defective. The section was intentionally designed to pro-
tect prospective defendants against undue liability' 2 and as a result, this
phrase was included. Consequently, an injured plaintiff is required to es-
tablish that the damaging event was caused by a defective product, and
that this defective condition was an unreasonably dangerous one.1 3 Thus,
a reasonable person would not have expected the harm.
Some states, such as California, have refused to follow this position,
stating that it is too onerous to require a plaintiff to establish both ele-
ments. 64 However, the majority view has decidedly rejected the Califor-
nia rule, 6 ' and has required that a plaintiff allege and prove that the
product was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous. 6 As
one court stated, "To speak in terms of 'defect' only causes confusion
.... The key . . . is whether the product is 'unreasonably danger-
ous.' ;"" In this respect, 402A has been followed verbatim.
E. "[T]o the user or consumer or to his property . . ."
One of the principle reasons for the adoption of 402A was the inabil-
ity of the law of warranty to adequately deal with the issues that arose
tacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably
dangerous.
162. Greenman v. Yuba Power Co., 59 Cal. 2d 57, _, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1962). Although published three years before the final draft of section 402A, Jus-
tice Traynor, an author of the second Restatement, set forth in Greenman the common law
precursor to section 402A, the basic aim of strict liability. "The purpose of such liability is
to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manu-
facturers that put such products on the market rather than by injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves." Id.
163. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, -, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976) (in
order to recover in an action under section 402A, plaintiff must establish that the product
was in a defective condition when the product left control of the seller, was unreasonably
dangerous to the user, the defect was the cause of injuries, and the product reached the
consumer without substantial change in condition).
164. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, -, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 443 (1972) (to require proof of both product defect and unreasonably dangerous
condition places greater burden on injured plaintiff than is required in Greenman).
165. See, e.g., Burns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, -, 550 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1976)
(citing O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968)) (Arizona specifically
adopted section 402A and the concept of unreasonably dangerous defect, rejecting the Cali-
fornia approach); Potthoff v. Alms, 41 Colo. App. 51, -, 583 P.2d 309, 311 (1977) (majority
of states clearly mandate defective product must be shown to be unreasonably dangerous for
action in strict liability to prevail); Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110, -, 240
N.W.2d 154, 157 (1974) (unreasonably dangerous is essential element of product liability
action).
166. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, -, 386 A.2d 816, 828 (1978)
(plaintiff must prove that article which caused injury was unreasonably dangerous).
167. Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1968).
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when the damaging event injured a person who was not in privity with
the seller of the defective product.16 8 The need for a contractual relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the defendant in order to recover had long
been on the decline.169 The adoption of strict liability finally did away
with the issue of privity. The drafters of the section made relief available
if personal injury was sustained by the user, the consumer, or the prop-
erty of either.'7 0 The courts, however, have once more extended the provi-
sions of 402A to provide a remedy not mentioned in the original text.
Cases involving the innocent bystander are illustrative.1 7' There is
general agreement that since the bystander has no voice in the selection
of the product, nor any say in the inspection of the goods, nor any influ-
ence in the manner in which it is to be used, he or she more than any
other person involved in the damaging event, should be protectd by
402A.'17 ' Imposition of 402A in cases involving innocent bystanders is fur-
ther justified by the belief that it is equitable since no additional burden
is placed upon the seller. Since "[tihe same precautions required to pro-
tect the buyer or user would generally do the same for the bystander,"
168. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1852). The decision of Winterbot-
torn held products liability actions in check for over 60 years. The plaintiff sued the manu-
facturer of a stagecoach supplied to the British government for damages when the defective
vehicle overturned, causing injury. The court held that without privity of contract, the law
would provide a means of letting in an "infinity of actions" leading to "absurd and outra-
geous consequences." Id. at 404-05.
169 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In
MacPherson, Justice Cardozo created the eminently-dangerous-product exception to the
privity requirement, stating that a rule that extended liability beyond contracting parties
was not an anomaly when injury to others was a foreseeable result. Id. at -, 111 N.E. at
1054.
170. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965): "(1) One who sells any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property."
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment o (1965). The drafters of sec-
tion 402A recognized the possible need to protect those who come into casual or uninten-
tional contact with a defective product, but who are by definition beyond the scope of
"user" or "consumer." The drafters stated that there was no essential reason why plaintiffs,
such as bystanders, should be deprived of the protection of section 402A, but neither ap-
proved nor disapproved of such an expansion of the rule.
172. See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 587, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969) (bystander has no opportunity to inspect product or limit
purchase to only products from reputable manufacturers and is therefore in greater need of
protection from defective products); see also Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8, 11
(Mo. 1974) ("[Blecause of inability to 'kick the tires' the bystander is in need of more pro-
tection .... " (quoting Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, -, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831 (1972))).
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there is no resulting hardship. 7 3 The result, however, is that once again,
the text has been extended beyond its original terms.
F. "[I]s subject to liability for the physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property.
It may appear obvious that the intent of 402A is to compensate for
physical injuries or property damage sustained by users and consumers.
The courts, however, have in some instances projected the coverage of
this section far beyond its apparent scope.
In one of the earliest cases, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ex-
tended 402A to include economic loss. In Santor v. A. & M. Karagheu-
sian, Inc.' 74 the plaintiff purchaser's only compensable injury was the
purchase price. After laying carpet, it became apparent that it was defec-
tive. A line, due to an improper dying process, became increasingly no-
ticeable. As the pile wore down, the line became worse and two additional
lines appeared.175 Plaintiff brought suit, and in a unanimous decision, the
court held that a cause of action could be maintained against the manu-
facturer on either of two theories: Breach of implied warranty of reasona-
ble fitness or strict liability.'76 The court reasoned that liability was im-
posed in this case to insure that the cost of injury was borne by the
product manufacturer who put the product into the stream of com-
merce. 77 In other words, if an individual sustained loss, whether to the
person, property, or of an economic nature, as a result of a defective
product placed into the market place, the manufacturer would be held
strictly liable.
Barely four months after Santor was decided, it was rejected by the
Supreme Court of California in Seely v. White Motor Co.' 78 Plaintiff had
purchased a truck manufactured by the defendant. After taking posses-
sion, it became obvious that the vehicle was defective. When the brakes
failed and the truck overturned, plaintiff brought suit seeking to recover
damages related to the repair of the truck and damages for loss of busi-
173. Giberson, 504 S.W.2d at 12.
174. 44 N.J. 52, -, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965) (where only damage is to product sold
and other property, manufacturer is still strictly liable to consumer).
175. Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 307.
176. Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 310, 312.
177. Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 312 (strict liability arises from mere presence of product on
the market).
178 63 Cal. 2d 9, -, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (doctrine of strict
liability governs distinct problems of physical injuries and has not superseded scheme of
recovery under breach of warranty).
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ness due to the accident.'7 9 The California Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's award of damages in the amount of the payments made plus
lost profits on the grounds that defendant manufacturer had breached an
express warranty to plaintiff.' s0 The majority opinion, written by Chief
Justice Traynor, condemned Santor's application of strict liability princi-
ples to a case involving economic loss alone.'"' In effect, Justice Traynor
emphasized that strict liability was applicable only when the injuries were
related to the safety of the product, not for the violation of a contractual
expectation.182
After almost twenty-five years, Seely appears to represent the major-
ity position on the issue of whether strict liability should apply when eco-
nomic loss is plaintiff's only injury. ' s3 Nevertheless, it is clear that once
again, some courts have gone beyond the intended limits of 402A.
Punitive damages represent another area in which the courts have
extended the scope of this section."8 Nowhere in the ambit of 402A are
exemplary damages provided for, yet the courts have had no difficulty in
awarding them.18 In fact, some of the more noteworthy decisions involve
179. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
180. Id. at , 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
181. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (strict liability was designed to
govern problem of physical injuries, not undermine warranty).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 771 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1985) (ma-
jority of jurisdictions have not permitted recovery of purely economic losses in negligence or
strict liability action); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962, 971 (D. Ariz.
1975) (laws of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Texas do not permit recovery of
purely economic loss under theory of strict liability), aff'd, 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, -, 581
P.2d 784, 791 (1978) (purchaser of defective product who sustained only economic loss, but
no personal injury or property damage, cannot recover in products liability action against
manufacturer); see also Washington Water Power v. Graybar Elec. Co., 112 Wn.2d 847, 774
P.2d 1199 (1989) (product liability act preempts common law remedies, therefore no recov-
ery allowed for economic loss).
184. See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 109 (6th Cir. 1975) (under Ohio
law, punitive damages may be awarded in products liability action where failure to design
product or warn public amounted to conduct that was intentionally reckless, wanton, or
gross), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Cnrp., 297 N.W.2d 727,
741 (Minn. 1980) (in products liability action against manufacture, of pajamas which caught
fire and burned a child, jury could find that manufacturer's con uc, was with disregard for
the rights of others and award of punitive damages of $1,000,0,-.00 ,-as not excessive), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Vi'. . 260, -, 294 N.W.2d
437, 444-45 (1980) (punitive damages can be recovered on theory .17 strict product liability
where defendant's conduct was outrageous).
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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the recovery of such an award. Much has been written on this issue,186
and the pros and cons of these recoveries need not be discussed at pre-
sent. The issue of punitive damages is mentioned here only to emphasize
how some courts have gone far afield of the original parameters of the
section.
G. "[I]f (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct .. ."
As noted above, even though the second Restatement speaks in
terms of a sale,18 7 it is clear that this term has been interpreted to mean
"one who places into the stream of commerce."' 88 This is true regardless
of the means used to introduce the product in question into the market
place."8 The courts, however, have been very strict in interpreting this
section as being applicable only to those transactions wherein the defend-
ant is in the business of placing the product in question into the channels
of commerce.' 0 In other words, isolated transactions do not come within
the realm of intended liability. If the defendants are engaged in the busi-
ness of selling such a product, strict liability applies. If they are not then
the injured plaintiff's remedy lies in some other area of law.' 9'
H. "[A]nd (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold"
In addition to establishing a defect, an injured plaintiff must also be
able to allege and prove that the product was in its defective condition at
the time it left the defendant's control. 9 ' In fact, it may be a defense for
an individual to be able to claim that the product was tampered with or
186. See, e.g., Annotation, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Case,
13 A.L.R. 4th 52 (1982); Allen, Controlling the Growth of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability Cases, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 567 (1986); Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The
Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1 (1985-86).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
188. See, e.g., Link v. Sun Oil Co., 160 Ind. App. 310, -, 312 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1974)
(the word "sell" is merely descriptive and product need not be actually sold if placed into
stream of commerce by other means).
189. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1967) (strict liability
applies to those who distribute samples in hopes of making future sales).
190. See Gardner v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 675 F.2d 658, 661 (5th Cir. 1982) (strict
liability is not applicable to entities who construct a product but are not normally in the
business of selling such items); Bailey v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 536 F. Supp. 84, 87 (N.D. Ohio
1982) (under Ohio law, occasional seller is not subject to strict product liability); Kaneko v.
Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Haw. 447, _ 654 P.2d 343, 351 (1982) (the "occasional seller"
exception applies to an ordinary person involved in the isolated sale of a product).
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965).
192. Id. comment g.
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in some way altered, after it was placed into the stream of commerce. 9 3
This position is not only logical, but equitable as well. If one considers all
of the policy arguments underlying the doctrine,'94 strict product liability
should only ensue when the product was in a defective condition at the
time it left the defendant's possession.'"1 Any other interpretation would
result, not in strict liability, but absolute liability.9 6 An individual would
be liable for events taking place after they were no longer in control,
which was clearly never the intention of this section. In the interpretation
of this part of the second Restatement, as was the case in the preceding
discussion, the courts have closely adhered to the drafters' intent.
I. "The rule stated in Section (1) applies although (a) the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product
As clarified by the section noted above, negligence is never an issue
in a product liability suit. Any argument that the defendant did what was
reasonable and/or prudent under the circumstances is not relevant. The
basis of liability under 402A is strict products liability, and this is true in
regard to the designing, manufacturing, and/or marketing of the product
in question. 9 ' The fact that the defendant did, could have, or should
have foreseen harm and thus should have acted as a reasonable prudent
person to avoid it never arises. The only questions asked are: Was the
product a defective one, and did this defect cause the damaging event?
J. "[A]nd (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller"
Finally, this last part of 402A stresses that privity is no longer an
issue. The fact that the user, consumer, or as we have seen, the innocent
bystander has no contractual relationship with the defendant is immate-
rial." 8 Privity, which was so important in the early days of product liabil-
193. See, e.g., Trotter v. Hamill Mfg. Co., 143 Mich. App. 593, -, 372 N.W.2d 622,
625-26 (1985) (where defect is created by alteration, manufacturer or seller may not be held
liable); Burch v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 320 Pa. Super. 444, -, 467 A.2d 615, 620 (1983) ("If
the condition of a product is substantially changed before it reaches the consumer, the man-
ufacturer or seller will not be held strictly liable.").
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments g, h & i (1965).
195. See, e.g., Colvin v. Robert E. McKee, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (product must be shown to be defective when it left manufacturer).
196. Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1966) (manufacturer is not
insurer).
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment a (1965).
198. Id. comment 1.
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ity law,'99 is no longer an element needed for recovery under this sec-
tion.20 0 In fact, one of the early arguments in favor of adopting 402A was
the inability of the courts to effectively deal with the problems that arose
where privity did not exist.2 0' Presently, such issues are important only
from a historical point of view.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to illustrate that the section of
the second Restatement enacted in 1965 is not necessarily the law that is
in effect today. Now that two-and-one-half decades have passed since the
adoption of 402A, much of the early uncertainty associated with it has
abated. For the most part, the concept and its elements are firmly estab-
lished. What is clear, however, is that the apparent intent of the drafters
has in some respects been altered. The section has been extended to in-
clude events and individuals not mentioned in the original text. As a re-
sult, today we can in effect restate the Restatement so as to reflect the
current law. Section 402A should now read as follows:
(1) One who places into the stream of commerce any product which
is defective in its manufacture, design, or marketing scheme and as such
is in an unreasonably dangerous condition to the user, consumer, or inno-
cent bystander, or to that person's property is subject to strict liability
for physical harm and economic loss, and may be subject to liability for
punitive damages thereby caused to the ultimate user, consumer, or in-
nocent bystander, or to that person's property, if (a) the seller is engaged
in the business of placing such product into the stream of commerce, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user, consumer, or innocent by-
stander without substantial change.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although the defendant
has exercised all possible care in the manufacture, design, or marketing
scheme of the product, and (b) there is a total lack of privity between
such parties.
199. See generally Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1925).
200. Prosser, supra note 37, at 791 (Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960), marked "the fall of the citadel of privity").
201. See generally Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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